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Introduction  
Like so many other western countries, increasing productivity and participation are central 
drivers of national reforms in Australia. Set against stories of a future of doom and gloom (led 
by an aging society) interventions are imagined that target education, training and work 
(National Reform Initiative Working Group, 2005). Few of these interventions are imagined 
without the support of some sort of research to frame the ‘problems’, as well as the ‘solutions’. 
What this means then is that research in adult education, training and work will continue to be 
in demand, at least for the foreseeable future. Moreover, with economic downturn on the 
horizon, along with likely rises in unemployment, demands for further research in adult 
education, training and work are not likely to diminish any time soon. In short, adult education 
researchers have responsibility to produce ‘really useful research’ that can work to shape these 
current, and future, interventions.  
 
However, the responsibility of producing ‘useful’, or ‘good’ research creates tensions for many 
researchers in adult education. On the one hand, ‘good research’, as far as the state is 
concerned, equates to ‘scientific research’ (Yates, 2004): an equation shared across most 
western countries policy, funding and decision making (OECD, 2004). Such research is based 
on knowable and (ac)countable world/s in response to calls for ‘hard evidence’. Numbers, it 
seems, are ‘really useful’ for government policy and decision makers: for them it is clear that 
what is ‘countable’ counts. However, more than describing reality, Rose points out that 
‘numbers actually construct reality’ (1999:212) -  so what happens when it is a ‘different’ reality 
in need of construction? What if we imagine constructing change that points towards a more 
socially just society. What about making ‘what counts’ countable? Contemplating this idea 
raises questions about how researchers might operate within a climate that privileges scientific 
modes of research, as well as a healthy suspicion of these modes of research, without also 
jettisoning some hope for a different (better?) future? How might we negotiate the complexities 
of these tensions as well as strive to be ethical in our endeavours? These are questions I am 
struggling with as an early career researcher, and in this paper I suggest that a pagan 
approach to research offers some promise in this regard.  
 
As my starting point, I want to stress that the desire for social justice need not be called off ... 
just reconfigured. I want to imagine research that ‘counts’ the world, even when the researchers 
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are deeply suspicious of the produce. I want to consider mimicking of ‘scientific’ research or 
quantitative methods as a parody or even a deconstructive strategy (Parker, 1997:69): through 
the development of ‘ruses and setting the imagination to work’ (Lyotard & Thebaud, 1985:61).  
This, I believe is a risky strategy, but one surely worth exploring. 
 
I am calling such a proposed strategy ‘a pagan approach’. The term ‘pagan’ is taken from 
Lyotard (1998) and this paper draws attention to four resonating aspects of a pagan approach 
to research. I present them here as ‘not quite’, ‘ethical’, ‘other Others’ and ‘multi-paradigm’. 
This paper begins paper by exploring the notion of pagan that first grabbed my attention and 
this was the notion of it being ‘not quite’. Following this initial discussion, I propose that the 
most salient attractions of taking a pagan stance is that it is an ‘ethical’ one, and implicated in 
this is a responsibility to others. While my initial take on a responsibility to others makes a case 
for pursuing social justice, next I point out a responsibility to ‘other Others’. For example I look 
toward the other of researcher, of coherence and of method. Finally, and related to thinking 
about the other, I suggest that a pagan approach is a ‘multi-paradigmatic’ one. In all, I suggest 
that these four aspects constitute a promising approach to research that seeks to work 
productively with the complexities inherent in the contemporary environment where research 
must be not only ‘accountable’, but also innovative. 
 
A pagan approach to research 
The concept of pagan to which I refer is drawn from Lyotard (Lyotard, 1988, 1989; 
Lyotard & Thebaud, 1985) and was developed around the same time that Lyotard 
produced his well-known work: ie, The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge 
(1984). With this understanding, a pagan approach can first be understood as ‘not quite’ 
postmodern. To be sure it has been suggested that we were never (quite) modern 
anyway (Latour, 1993), and it is the notion of ‘not quite’ that first attracted me.  
 
Understanding pagan as ‘not quite’ postmodern’ is helpful for researchers eager to 
resist the legitimate available approaches – even if uncertain why. For example, a pagan 
approach offers me (as an early career researcher) an opportunity to explore the 
potential and limitations of a range of orthodox approaches. A pagan approach avoids 
an evangelistic following of any one ‘ism’ and, in doing so, does not limit opportunities 
to see potential of others.  
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I stress that I do not propose ‘paganism’, but a pagan approach or position. To take a 
pagan position to research is ‘not quite’ the wholesale uptake of a particular belief 
system – like a faith. Lyotard and others use the term paganism, but for me this conjures 
up ideas of a bounded set of beliefs. The etymology of ‘pagan’ is found in the late Latin 
word paganus, and means ‘country dweller’. A ‘country dweller’ is more about location 
or position than about faith-fullness and therefore the pagan is understood in a 
positional sense rather than faith-based (or not). However, a ‘position’ (pagan or 
otherwise) can be multiple, context dependent and not immutable to change. Importantly 
then, a position is understood as neither a fixed nor a singular one. A pagan approach 
can invest in multiple ideas (simultaneously even), hence it is multi-positional.  
 
While I make distinction between a pagan ‘position’ and a ‘faith’, I also acknowledge that 
contemporary use of the term of pagan is imbued with other meanings. While ideas 
associated with the contemporary notion of pagan may seem akin to ‘faith’, some of 
these ideas also have appeal. Ideas from contemporary neo-pagans add interesting 
dimensions to the idea of a pagan researcher, and serve to introduce my assertion that a 
pagan approach to research is an ethical approach. The everyday use of pagan is more 
typically used to refer to those ‘not quite’ converted’ - ‘irreligious’ or ‘hedonistic’. Neo-
pagans describe themselves as a broad collection offering alternatives to the 
‘dogmatism of religious mainstream’ (Raymond, 2005:np), and while some might think 
them ignorant of religious teachings, they claim the converse (Glick 2005:np). Pagans 
(I?) do not care for a ‘priestly’ elite, nor care for ‘final answers to big questions’, yet 
importantly they (we) do care for others (Raymond 2005:np). This care for others, indeed 
acknowledging a ‘responsibility to the Other’, leads to the initial suggestion that a pagan 
approach is an ethical one (Usher 2000:184-185). 
 
Aside from notions of being ‘not quite’ postmodern/modern, the aspect of a pagan 
approach that has most salience is that it is, despite any aspersions it may cast, an 
ethical stance. However, an ethical stance is more than adhering to a set of rules: did the 
participants give their informed consent? are tapes and transcripts stored 
appropriately?... etc. While I do not suggest that these are unimportant considerations 
for research, a pagan ‘responsibility for the other’ understands ethical considerations to 
extend beyond these questions. While there are several ‘others’ to which the pagan is 
responsible, a first is seen in the pursuit of justice.  
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Like much of Lyotard’s work, pursuing justice is central and necessary (Lyotard, 1984, 
1988; Lyotard & Thebaud, 1985). These just pursuits are particularly evident in his work 
on the pagan (Lyotard and Thebaud, 1985) and the differend (Lyotard, 1988). For Lyotard, 
the issue of justice focuses on criteria for judgements. His point is that in the 
postmodern there are not universal criteria against which one can judge what is 
considered to be just: rather, there are many criteria. Importantly (and the part that 
appeals to me) a lack of universal criteria does not preclude efforts to seek justice – 
what it does mean though is that judgements made in the absence of universal criteria 
are localised, specific and yet open to negotiation. Moreover, any judgement made 
presupposes other possible judgements. Criteria are not only contestable but what 
might reasonably considered just in one situation is not necessarily so in another – just 
for all people at all times. In short, Lyotard advocates for not only a justice of multiplicity 
but also a multiplicity of justices (Barron, 1992), and this is not the same as a universal 
justice. 
 
Underpinning the notion of universal justice is a consensual universal humanity. Many 
believe that such a humanity exists and consequently Lyotard has been scorned for his 
‘juvenile’, ‘unoriginal’, ‘lame’ and ‘dangerous’ ideas (Rojeck, 1998:4,13,2). While the 
general idea of a common humanity has its appeal, the idea has troubled others who 
have different readings of Lyotard than Rojeck. Readings (1992) provides an example 
where, as pagan, he recognises the incommensurability of the pursuit and advocates 
not for celebration of difference, but for acknowledgement of differences being 
inaccessible. For Readings, Lyotard’s message is rejection of the common practice of 
countering an oppressive metanarrative with another, more developed or ‘purer’ one: a 
newer better model. Drawing on Lyotard, he suggests ‘the question of justice cannot be 
resolved in terms of models’ (Readings 1992:170). Hence, in response to those (like 
Rojeck) who might argue that pagan research is an ethical vacuum, Readings argues 
that pagan judgement ‘allows the question of justice to be kept alive’ (1992:168).  
 
However, unlike Readings (who rejects common humanity), or Rojeck (who has already 
identified it), Bauman (2001a) neither fully subscribes nor totally rejects. Rather, he 
desires some notion of a common humanity, but not one framed in the modernist 
thought. Similarly others, who have been inspired by Lyotard, talk about an Idea of 
justice – unattainable - something that cannot be grasped, yet something worth striving 
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for (Barron 1992). So, aligning to some degree with Readings, Bauman and Lyotard in 
desiring something that I cannot imagine, I too am unwilling to call off the search. 
 
Despite a somewhat uncomfortable realisation that I cannot ‘save the world’, the pursuit 
of (a problematic) justice echoes a pursuit for ‘social justice’ of my earlier work in the 
general fields of adult community education and community development. For me (and 
for many others in these fields of practice) social justice still constitutes a goal worth 
pursuing. Indeed, pursuing social justice in the contemporary socio-economic climate is 
more urgent than ever - yet ironically hindered by the very conditions that make it so 
(Abrahamson, 2004; Bauman, 2000).  
 
However, the concept of social justice itself is not innocent. Like imagined 
notions of ‘humanity’ and ‘community’ (Bauman, 2001; Bryson & Mowbray, 1981; 
Mowbray, 2004), ‘social justice’ is unattainable – but this acknowledgement and 
absolution from the pursuit are not one of the same. Hence, a ‘just’ pursuit is not 
an easy one and those who work in fields where ‘care for the other’ is the raison 
d’etre increasingly find themselves on the defensive (Bauman 2000:9). Bauman 
stresses the importance of seeking (a problematic) social justice, but goes on to 
lament the difficulties of the pursuit in the contemporary socio-political climate 
(Bauman 2000:9).  
 
A pagan approach to research holds promise considering a further similarity shared 
between neo-pagans and pagan researchers. This is that both are eclectic. The neo-
pagan borrows, adopts and adapts a range of beliefs and practices (Glick, 2005). 
Likewise, Lyotard and Thebaud concede a similar notion when they suggest that to be 
pagan is to recognise that ‘one can play several games’ (Lyotard & Thebaud, 1985:61). 
This is also to imply an acceptance of heterogeneity - an acceptance which itself 
constitutes an ethical moment (Usher 2000:171). In other words, a pagan stance might 
deploy a variety of strategies, even if considered partial and limited, or even unworthy in 
other circumstances. For example, while responsibilities for the other have largely been 
staged in moral and ethical discourses, Bauman suggests that these arguments 
typically lack resonance within the dominant contemporary discourses of western 
societies (2000:9). However, the pagan researcher can stage their arguments in 
dominant discourses – but without utopian purchase. Therefore, as pagans, we can set 
about counting what we believe counts. We can negotiate the complexities of the socio-
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political and educational landscapes not only with epistemological understandings but 
also with ethical considerations.  
 
While I have argued for a ‘responsibility for the other’ in regard to pursuing social 
justice, there are also other ‘Others’ for whom pagan researchers take responsibility for. 
The Other is not a homogenous other, rather the Other is heterogenous. A pagan stance 
then also necessitates a reflexiveness that draws attention to the other of ‘method’ 
(writing). Usher explains: 
Method ‘forgets’ that research is writing... The ‘forgetting’ of writing is but 
an attempt to name the unnameable and say the unsayable, the attempt to 
account for everything and resolve all problems, to ‘master’ reality as it 
really is – and thus to fail in that responsibility to the Other which is ethics 
(Usher 2000:184-185). 
 
For Usher, ethical moments precede methods (Usher, 2000:162). In my pagan effort not 
to forget, I am intent on remembering writing. Implicated in this remembering is an 
acknowledgement of the other of ‘knowing’ (not knowing) and of ‘consistency’ 
(multiplicity). What all this means for me is that a pagan stance to research is not nearly 
as occupied with ‘methods’ as one might anticipate. This lack is not an oversight but 
(following Usher) more an ‘acknowledgement of the limits to methods’ and moreover an 
‘acknowledgement of what comes before them’ (2000:162). Here this is a ‘not quite’ 
innocent responsibility to heterogenous others.  
 
A pagan approach to a research project, without an anchoring ‘ism’, may be a cause of 
anxiety for some. After all, investments in paradigmatic perspectives can help 
researchers select (and reject for that matter) their methods. However, the eclecticism of 
a pagan approach has the benefit of ‘borrowing’ and ‘adapting’ from a range of methods 
that are drawn from multiple paradigmatic perspectives simultaneously. For example the 
reflexiveness, ethical spin and epistemological understandings underpinning notions of 
pagan research can borrow and adapt positivist and post-positivist methods - but 
without the illusions.  Borrowed and adapted not for their capacity to somehow get 
closer to ‘the truth’, but as Gergen suggests for their ‘pragmatic implications’ (in 
Hassard, 1995:135).   
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In this way pagan research endorses multi-paradigm research (Hassard 1995). As the 
name suggests, multi-paradigm research works across paradigms that may otherwise 
be seen as incommensurable, and in doing so offers great potential by providing 
‘several lenses for its analytical camera’ (Hassard, 1995:88). Pagan research is not 
aligned with the view that paradigms are mutually exclusive. A pagan stance to research 
does not reject ideas outright, but rather approaches them with doubt (Burbules, 1998).  
This is because the pagan rejects the possibility of a ‘perfect lens’, and so with no 
‘perfect lens’ the pagan is aware that they must choose among flawed choices 
(including the ‘isms’ that are subject to much critique). Pagans must choose, because 
not choosing constitutes a silencing, itself flagging further injustice (Lyotard, 1988). 
Nevertheless, while in traditional research it is important to ‘remain faithful’ to 
paradigmatic perspectives, multi-paradigm (and pagan) research enables researchers to 
produce contradictory accounts without excessive concern for internal consistencies – 
indeed by making interesting patterns because of inconsistencies. Thus, to be pagan is 
to anticipate and to work productively with multiplicity, and working productively with 
multiplicity means that differences are kept in play.  
 
Refusal to be a ‘faithful follower’ of a particular paradigm is itself an ethical choice. To 
attempt to invert or replace an idea with a more preferable one is to engage in what has 
been termed the ‘gladiator paradigm’: that is, ‘an approach to argumentation which 
insists that the truth of one position is only confirmed by the annihilation of all 
competing positions’ (Rojeck 1998:12).  Hence, even though I might somewhat agree 
with many critiques of various paradigms, I do not feel a need to annihilate them 
altogether (best leave this for the gladiators). Moreover, to annihilate competing 
positions would constitute further injustice. Rather, with no ‘perfect’ paradigm my 
choices are more about how I participate in the paradigmatic games, develop moves and 
redefine the rules. Or as Barron suggests, how I might ‘match wits, or ‘ruse’ [...] to make 
experimental moves within the language games that situate us’ (1992:39). So while 
everything (including Lyotard’s thesis) might be dangerous, this is not to deny the 
potential of everything either – whether this presents problems or possibilities is a case 
of ‘it depends’ (Barron 1992).  It is not so much about ‘being right’ as it is about opening 
spaces where educational practices, identities and possible futures might be 




This paper began by briefly outlining some tensions for researchers. These tensions 
were  between the resonating calls for ‘hard evidence’ and a suspicion of scientific 
methods, along with a desire for a socially just world. In this paper I argued that a pagan 
approach to research holds promise in enabling research to produce ‘really useful 
research’ that works productively with these tensions, yet at the same time retain a 
problematic Idea of justice. What this pagan research might look like is left unexplored 
here, however it seems to offer promise for establishing ‘truths’ and yet destabilising 
them at the same time. Indeed, even the untenable idea of justice, to which the approach 
subscribes, is not beyond destabilising.  
 
While humbled by, yet committed to, this untenable project and its responsibilities, it is 
worth concluding that research, and the accounts of the world it produces, do not exist 
in a world purged of funding bodies, institutional priorities and histories (Edwards, 
Clarke, Harrison, & Reeve, 2002:136). Some texts, under some conditions, have more 
currency than others. If we are to speak we must choose a voice in a moment where 
there seems a proliferation of tragic voices. We must choose among tragic voices, or 
remain silent. While this seems unjust, what is truly unjust is removing the possibility of 
speaking at all. I have argued here that a pagan approach may hold promise in such a 
‘righting’ pursuit’. I concede that it is risky but, given the stakes, perhaps it is a 
‘necessary risk’: 
There is only one way to evade this risk, which is not to engage in an act of 
reading or interpretation at all (Biesta, 2001:36-37).  
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